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Abstract
In the vast majority of the literature on the economics of copyright royalties, it is assumed that the
copyright holder is remunerated either by a ﬁxed payment or by a payment that amounts to an additional
marginal cost to the user, or both. However, in some signiﬁcant instances in the real-world, copyright
holders are constrained to a compensation scheme that involves revenue sharing. That is, the copyright
holder takes as remuneration a part of the user’s revenue. In essence, the remuneration is set as a tax on
the user’s revenue. This paper analyses such remuneration mechanisms, establishing and analysing the
optimal tax rate, and also the Nash equilibrium tax rate that would emerge from a fair and unconstrained
bargaining problem. The second option provids a rate that may be useful for regulatory authorities.
∗richard.watt@canterbury.ac.nz. I am grateful to the hospitality of ICER in Turin (Italy), where I was visiting
while this paper was written.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In much of the literature on copyright royalty contracts, the copyright royalty is set as either a
ﬁxed cost to the user or as an element of additional marginal cost (see, for example, Kamien and
Tauman (1986), Wang (1998), Fosfuri and Roca (2004), and Sen (2005)). This is reasonable for
some, but not all settings. While the royalty earnings of artists, singers and literary authors are
often set as above, in other cases the royalty payment that is allocated to the copyright holder as
compensation is set as a tax upon the user´s revenue. This, for example, is the typically the case
for music that is played publicly on the radio. The literature on revenue sharing contracts is quite
extense, although it concentrates almost exclusively upon correcting for incentive eﬀects along the
supply chain (see, for example, Cachon and Lariviere (2005), and Wang et al. (2004)). There is
also a small literature that examines revenue sharing in the video rental market (Dana and Spier
(2001), Mortimer (2008)). However, as far as I am aware, there has not been any attempt to
examine theoretically the optimal royalty tax for the copyright holder to set. This paper attempts
such an analysis.
While the model is framed in terms of a copyright transaction, in reality it can just as easily
be applied to any scenario in which an essential input is supplied in exchange for a participation
in revenues. The fact that the compensation for the supplier of the essential input is given by
a participation in revenues, and not in proﬁts, makes the model rather interesting and certainly
non-trivial.
2 Modelling assumptions
We shall assume that the setting is one of a copyright holder and a copyright user. The copyright
holder1 supplies an essential input to the user’s production process (access to the creative good in
question), in the sense that without access to the input, the user is unable to produce any output
for consumers. We assume that the user acts as a monopolist in the market for the ﬁnal good that
1 The term “copyright holder” is used liberally. More precisely, the supplier of the essential input could be a
collecting society that represents a whole group of copyright holders, and the essential input could be an entire
repertory of individual elements.
1he produces, which we denote by x, and likewise the copyright holder acts as a monopolist in the
supply of the essential input. For reasons that are determined exogenously (e.g. the prevailing
legal environment), the remuneration of the copyright holder is set as a tax on the revenue that
is generated by the user. We assume that the demand for the ﬁnal consumption good produced
by the user is linear, that is the price at which the good is sold is given by
p(x)=1− bx
and that the user’s production process is also linear (i.e. it is characterised by constant marginal
cost), with marginal cost equal to c, where that at all times c<1. The user is assumed to face
no ﬁxed costs, and his objective is to maximise monetary proﬁts. The issue of ﬁxed costs will be
discussed below in a separate section. Note that the demand vertical intercept has been set to 1.
This is without loss of generality, and simply sets the units of measurement for the problem.
W ea r eo n l yi n t e r e s t e di nt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ec o p y r i g h tg o o d( t h a tw h i c hi st h ee s s e n t i a l
input to the user’s production process) is already in existence. For that reason, the copyright
holder faces no costs at all in the supply of the input to the user, and so the objective of the
copyright holder is to maximise income.
3A n a l y s i s
The compensation for the copyright holder is a revenue tax,2 and so for any given choice of output
x, assuming that the tax is set at t, the user ends up with a proﬁto f
π(t)=( 1 − t)(1 − bx)x − cx
=[ ( 1 − t)(1 − bx) − c]x (1)
The copyright holder would get an income of
R(t)=t(1 − bx)x (2)
Once the tax rate has been set, the user will then freely choose his level of output, x,t o
2 Of course this is exactly the same as a tax on price (an ad valorem tax), at least in the context of the present
paper. The equivalence is due to the assumption of a demand curve, and a single price for all customers.
2maximise his proﬁts. Maximising π(t) with respect to x gives
x∗(t)=
(1 − t) − c
2b(1 − t)
(3)
The optimal level of output is a decreasing and concave function of the tax rate:
x∗0(t)=−
c
2b(1 − t)2 < 0 x∗00(t)=−
c
b(1 − t)3 < 0 (4)
Our principal analysis is of the copyright holder’s income function. We are interested in
considering the value of t that will maximise it, subject to the user’s proﬁt remaining non-negative.
It is useful to separate the analysis of t =1from the analysis of t<1. Clearly, from (3), if t =1 ,
the optimal level of output is not deﬁned. There is a correspondence between c =0and t =1 .




2b. What about if t =1 ?T o ﬁnd out what the optimal output would be
we need to analyse the optimal level of output in limit as t approaches 1. But using L’Hopital´s











Thus, independently of what level of t is used, when c =0the user will set output at 1
2b.B u t
this implies that the total amount of revenue earned is a constant, equal to
¡







Since the user does not alter output (or revenue) in response to a change in the tax rate, the best
choice of the copyright holder is clearly to set the tax rate as high as possible in this case, and so
we get t∗(c)|c=0 =1 . With this tax rate, the user produces a strictly positive level of output, and
generates a strictly positive level of revenues, which the copyright holder then takes entirely as the
royalty payment. The user ends up with 0, and thus is indiﬀerent between producing optimally
and not producing at all. Given this, we shall only be concerned from now on with scenarios of
c>0. Since it is also necessary that c<1, in all that follows we will only be concerned with
0 <c<1.
The non-negativity assumption on the user’s proﬁt implies that there is a maximum tax rate
that the copyright holder cannot exceed. To calculate this maximum, consider again the user’s
proﬁt for any tax rate t, assuming of course that the user sets his output choice optimally given
3that tax rate;
π(t)=[ ( 1− t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c]x∗(t)
The eﬀect of a change in t is given by the ﬁrst derivative of π(t),w h i c hi s
π0(t)=[ ( 1− t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c]x∗0(t) − (1 − bx∗(t))x∗(t) − (1 − t)bx∗0(t)2
S i n c ew em u s th a v eπ(t) > 0, it happens that [(1 − t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c] > 0, and since x∗0(t) < 0 the
ﬁrst term is negative. The second term is also negative since (1−bx∗(t)) > (1−t)(1−bx∗(t))−c>0,
and clearly the third term is also negative. Thus for any t, once output is set optimally, π0(t) < 0.
Theorem 1 The maximum tax rate that the copyright holder can set is t =1− c.
Proof. T h ef a c tt h a tt h eu s e r ’ sp r o ﬁti sd e c r e a s i n gi nt implies that the maximum tax rate
that can be set, t,s a t i s ﬁes
π(t)=
£
(1 − t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c
¤
x∗(t)=0
So either (1 −t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c =0 ,o rx∗(t)=0 . The tax rate that would set optimal output to
0 is easily calculated from (3) as
t1 =1− c
while the tax rate that sets (1 − t2)(1 − bx∗(t2)) − c =0is3
1 − t2 = c
But this is the same tax rate that sets optimal output to 0, i.e. t2 = t1. Thus the limit tax rate
for the copyright holder is t =1− c.
While it is necessary to go throught the above analysis of the maximum feasible tax rate, it is
also worthwhile to note the following:
Theorem 2 Assuming c>0, the copyright holder will never want to set the tax rate at (or of
course above) the maximum feasible level.
Proof. We are always assuming c<1, which implies that it is always possible for the activities
of the user to generate positive proﬁts, and of course positive revenue. However, if the tax rate
3 See section 1 of the appendix for all of the steps used in ﬁnding this equation.
4on revenue is set at the maximum feasible level identiﬁed in Theorem 1, the optimal response of
the user is to set output at 0, and thus total revenue generated is also 0. This means that the
copyright holder will earn no royalty income at all. However, setting the tax rate at a smaller
level, such that now the user does produce a positive level of output, and generates a positive
total revenue, will imply a positive level of earnings for the copyright holder. Thus, it will never
be optimal for the copyright holder to set the tax rate at the maximum level.
Theorem 2 has two implictions. First, since we are only concerned with scenarios of c>0,
we know that we always have t∗(c) < 1 − c<1. This is important as it implies that we can
always safely assume 1−t>0, so that divisions by 1−t (which will frequently be done) are valid.
Second, we can always safely ignore the restriction that the optimal tax rate set by the copyright
holder should satisfy t∗ ≤ 1−c, and then go ahead with studying the unconstrained optimisation
problem for the copyright holder, which is
max
t R(t)=t(1 − bx∗(t))x∗(t)
Substituting (3) into (2), we can then see that the copyright holder’s objective function is4
R(t)=t(1 − bx∗(t))x∗(t)
=
t((1 − t)2 − c2)
4b(1 − t)2 (5)
We would like to maximise (5) with an appropriate choice of t.I no r d e rt od ot h a t ,w eﬁrstly





















Since the second derivative is negative, R(t) is concave in t, and so the unconstrained optimal
t is found where the ﬁrst derivative is 0. That is
t∗ ← 1=
(1 + t∗)c2
(1 − t∗)3 (8)
4 See section 2 of the appendix for the working.
5 The working appears in section 3 of the appendix.
5We can analyse this equation in a variety of ways, but for now let us simply write f(c,t)=
1 −
(1+t)c2
(1−t)3 ,s ot h a tw eh a v ef(c,t∗)=0 . The analysis of the optimal tax rate can be done by
studying the roots of f(c,t).
Theorem 3 If c>0, there is a single root of f(c,t), and that root occurs at a t that satisﬁes
0 <t<1.
Proof. Note the following:
f (c,0) = 1 − c2 > 0
lim
t→1




c2(1 − t)3 +( 1+t)c23(1 − t)2
(1 − t)6
= −2c2 (2 + t)
(1 − t)4 < 0
Thus, the function f (c,t) starts out positive at t =0and it is negative as t approaches 1. So there
is at least one root of f (c,t) for a t between 0 and 1. However, since the slope of the function is
everywhere negative, there can only be a single root.
T h es h a p eo ft h ef u n c t i o nf (c,t) is shown in Figure 1.6 The root of the function, t∗,i st h e
unique optimal tax rate for the problem. For example, the graph in Figure 1 corresponds to c = 1
2,
i nw h i c hc a s ew eg e tt∗ =0 .3106.7
6 Throughout this paper, graphs are used to illustrate the equations derived. All of the graphs are computer
generated from the actual equations in the text, and so they are completely accurate representations of each
equation. The general characteristics of most of the equations we analyse can also be examined by recourse to the
implicit function theorem. However, given that we have the possibility of accurate drawings of the graphs of the
equations, which clearly indicate such aspects as slope and curvature, the mathematical analysis will be omitted.
7 Note that for this example, the constraining maximum feasible tax rate is 1 − c = 1
2, the unconstrained
optimum is indeed the global optimum for the problem.












Figure 1: The shape of f(c,t)
Given that there is a single root of the function f(c,t),w ec a nﬁnd it algebraicly as the solution
of (8). While not at all easy to do for a third order equation, this is certainly possible. Using the

























The graph of t∗(c), for all values of c between 0 and 1 is given in Figure 2. It is decreasing
and convex on the range of feasible values of c.










Figure 2: The optimal revenue tax, t∗(c)
4 Sharing of market surplus
I nt h ea b o v e ,w eh a v es i m p l yp e r f o r m e da na n a l y s is of the optimal tax rate, from the perspective
of the copyright holder. We might also wonder about how the total market surplus is shared
between the two parites under such a revenue sharing model.














































8 The working for this is again given in section 4 of the appendix.














R(t∗(c)) is displayed in Figure 3 as a function of c. It is a strictly increasing and
concave graph. At c =1 , the height of the graph is 0.5.










Figure 3: The shape of
π(t∗(c))
R(t∗(c))
From Figure 3, we can establish the following result:
Theorem 4 For all values of c, the copyright holder earns at least twice as much as the user;
R(t∗) > 2π(t∗).
Proof. The proof is evident from the fact that
π(t∗(c))
R(t∗(c)) is located everywhere below the value
1
2 over the relevant range of values of c.
5 The Nash bargaining solution
The model above has assumed that the copyright holder can set the rate optimally. We noted
that when this is done in any scenario in which positive proﬁt sc a nb em a d e( c<1), the copyright
holder will end up earning signiﬁcantly more of the total surplus than will the user. This is in
9 See section 5 of the appendix for this working.
9fact not unreasonable. Firstly, the copyright holder is supplying an essential input to the user’s
production process, and as such it is reasonable to assume that the copyright holder should earn
most of the surplus that is created, since without his input, no surplus at all is created. Secondly,
we are allowing the user to act as an unconstrained monopolist in the market for his output, and
so it seems fair to allow the same consideration to the copyright holder.
Never-the-less, if the monopoly power of the copyright holder were thought to be giving him
an unfair advantage, one could appeal to some other way of establishing the revenue sharing tariﬀ
rate. One logical option might be to appeal to the deal that would be struck in an unconstrained
bargaining game with symmetric bargaining powers. In order to model such a game, it is habitual
to use the Nash bargaining model (Nash (1950)), which seeks to ﬁnd the t that maximises the
Nash product, N(t)=π(t)R(t).10 In this section we look at this option.
In order to calculate the Nash product, it is useful to ﬁrstly re-write the user´s proﬁt function.




















Notice that, if the Nash product is concave, then its maximum occurs at tN such that12
R(tN)2
tN = π(tN)R0(tN) > 0
10 Of course the Nash bargaining model would really maximise the product of the diﬀerence between each utility
and the corresponding disagreement utility. But for the case at hand, disagreement implies no deal at all, in which
case both parties earn 0.
11 The working is in section 6 of the appendix.






where ε is the elasticity of copyright revenue to the tax rate.
10T h i si m p l i e st h a ti tm u s tb et h a tR0(tN) > 0,a n ds i n c eR(t) is concave in t, it holds that tN <t ∗.
So, assuming that the Nash product has a maximum at a concave point, the tax rate implied is
less than the optimal tax rate for the copyright holder. That is, the Nash bargaining outcome is
less favourable to the copyright holder, and more favourable to the user, than is the tax rate t∗.
In essence, the Nash solution removes the copyright holder´s monopoly power when the tax rate
is set.
It turns out that the Nash product is not everywhere concave, but it is concave around its
maximum. This feature can be established by looking at the second derivative, but doing this is
overly complex. Rather, we can look at the graph of the Nash product, and see its features there.






((1 − t) − c)2
(1 − t)
¶µ








t((1 − t) − c)2((1 − t)2 − c2)
(1 − t)3
¶














((1 − t) − c)
1 − t
¶3
t((1 − t)+c) (14)
Again, this is a rather complex looking equation, although it is certainly able to be analysed.
The graph of the equation for b = 1
4 and c = 1
2 is displayed in Figure 4:










Figure 4: The graph of N(t)
Clearly, while not concave everywhere (speciﬁcally, it is not concave for larger values of t), this
graph has a local maximum at a strictly concave section of the graph. Indeed, the graph goes
negative for values of t greater than 1
2, thus the maximum that is visable in the graph is the global
optimum for the Nash product.
In order to locate the maximum of the Nash product, we need to ﬁnd the tN that solves












((1 − t − c)(1 − 2t + c)(1 − t) − 3ct(1 − t + c)) (15)
As the ﬁrst three terms are positive (and assuming that the third term is ﬁnite, i.e. that t<1),
the ﬁrst derivative is zero at
n(t,c) ≡ (1 − t − c)(1 − 2t + c)(1 − t) − 3ct(1 − t + c)=0
The graph of n(t,c),f o rc = 1
2 is drawn in Figure 5. The point at which it crosses the axis, i.e.
the tax rate that maximises the Nash product, is tN =0 .16415.
13 The working is in section 7 of the appendix.










Figure 5: The shape of n(t,c)
Unfortunately, this time the algebraic solution to N0(tN)=0proves to be extremely complex,
and thus not at all useful. However, we can ﬁnd a lower bound on tN that does have a reasonably
simple expression. Notice that n(t,c) is convex to the left of the point tN. Given that, the curve
n(t,c) lies above the tangent to this curve at t =0 . This implies that the value of tN must always
be greater than the point at which the tangent line to n(t,c) at t =0cuts the horizontal axis.
Lets call that point tNe, since it a value that estimates tN.
The derivative of n(t,c) is
∂n(t,c)
∂t
=( 1− t)(6t − 4) + c(4t − 2) − 2c2
At t =0 ,t h i si s
∂n(t,c)
∂t
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t=0
= −4 − 2c − 2c2
Also, note that n(0,c)=( 1− c)(1 + c)=1− c2. So, the point at which the tangent line cuts the
horizontal axis is given by
tNe =
1 − c2










13For example, with c = 1
2,f o rw h i c htN =0 .16415,w eg e ttNe =0 .13636. In Figure 6, the straight
line shows the tangent to n(t,c) at t =0 , and the point at which that line cuts the axis is tNe,
which clearly lies to the left of tN.










Figure 6: The relationship between tN and tNe
The graph of the lower bound on the Nash tax rate, as a function of c i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e7 .I t
is a strictly decreasing and concave function.14
14 The shape of this function suggests an even easier, although slightly worse approximation. Since tNe(c) is
concave, it lies everywhere above the straight line through its endpoints. This straight line is t = 1
4(1 − c).T h u s ,
1
4(1 − c) ≤ tNe(c) for all c.S i n c etNe(c) is not very concave, the approximation should be reasonably good, and
clearly the equation 1
4(1−c) is extremely simple. For the case of c = 1
2,f o rw h i c htN =0 .16415,a n dtNe =0 .13636,
we get 1
4(1 − c)=0 .125.












Figure 7: The shape of tNe(c)
W ec a na l s oc o n s i d e rt h ew a yi nw h i c ht h et o t al surplus is shared when the lower bound to






3+4 c +5 c2
1 − c2
¶µ
3+3 c2 − 2c3
3+8 c +7 c2 +2 c3
¶
Again, a rather formidable looking expression, but one that can be easily graphed. The graph
of the surplus sharing regime under the lower bound tax rate is given in Figure 8. The curve is
everywhere convex, valued at 3 when c =0 ,g o e si n ﬁnite as c →∞ , and has a minimum at c
approximately equal to 0.2055. At the minimum of the curve, the value of π
R is clearly greater
than 2.5 (actually, its minimum value is about 2.6414), and so for this tax rate, the user always
gets the lion’s share of the total surplus (the user’s proﬁti sa tl e a s tt w oa n dah a l ft i m e sg r e a t e r
than the copyright holder’s income for all possible values of c).
15 See section 8 of the appendix for the working.












Figure 8: The shape of
π(tNe)
R(tNe) for small values of c
6F i x e d c o s t s
One concern with the modelling above is the assumption that the user produces with no ﬁxed
costs. In reality, this assumption does not alter the calculation of either the copyright holder’s
optimal revenue tax, or the calculation of the Nash bargaining revenue tax. Of course, it also does
not aﬀect the calculation of the user’s optimal output, unless it serves to set optimal output to
0. The optimal revenue tax is simply found where the copyright holder’s income is maximised,
which is independent of any ﬁxed costs in the user’s production process. In the Nash model, in






where R and π are, respectively, the earnings of the copyright holder and the user when no deal is
struck. When ﬁxed costs are 0, since no deal means no surplus to share, we get R = π =0 .W h e n
there are ﬁxed costs of F,w es t i l lh a v eR =0 , but now we have πF(t)=π(t) − F,a n dπ = −F.






= R(t)(π(t) − F + F)
= R(t)π(t)
The only eﬀect of including ﬁxed costs for the user is that the upper limit revenue tax rate
that can be charged is altered, and may end up being a binding constraint upon the problem.
Speciﬁcally, since we know that
£
(1 − t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c
¤
x∗(t) is decreasing in the tax rate,
when the user faces ﬁxed costs of F,t h et a xr a t em u s tb es e ts u c ht h a t
πF(t)=[ ( 1− t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c]x∗(t) − F ≥ 0










(1 − t − c)2 − (1 − t)4bF ≥ 0
Consider the function h(t) ≡ (1 − t − c)2 − (1 − t)4bF. Its slopes are




= −(1 − t)4b<0
Since its second derivative is positive, h(t) is a convex function. Since the derivative in F is
negative, an increase in F shifts the function downwards.
Let’s start with the case of F =0 .I n t h a t c a s e , h(t) reaches its minimum exactly at the
horizontal axis (see Figure 9, in which c = 1
2). At that point, we have t =1− c.W e a r e o n l y
concerned with the decreasing part of the function, since we know that we must always restrict
t ≤ 1 − c in order that output be non-negative. In the case of F =0 , the entire negatively sloped
part of the function is valued positive, and so (as we already saw above), in this case the only
restriction on t is that it cannot go above 1 − c.












Figure 9: The shape of h(t) for F =0 .
Now, as F goes positive, the function moves downwards. This will generate two roots of the
function, one above 1−c (where the function will have positive slope) and one below 1−c (where
the function will have negative slope). Such a case is drawn in Figure 10, where it is assumed that
c = 1
2, bF = 1
40.












Figure 10: The shape of h(t) with F>0
18Since the function h(t) is negative between the lower root and the value 1 − c, we know that
we can only consider as valid tax rates those that are no greater than the lower root. Using the
quadratic formula, it can be shown that the lower root is at




bF + c (17)
Now, note that if the revenue tax were to be set at 0, the user receives the input free of charge.
It is not conceivable that this would result in a negative overall proﬁt. If it did, then really there
is no reasonable business proposal in the ﬁrst place. Thus, at t =0 , it is entirely reasonable that
the user earns a strictly positive proﬁt. In terms of our graphs, this converts to the condition that
h(0) > 0,t h a ti s






1 − 2c − c2¢
>F
Note that this condition implies that t0(c,F) > 0. The graph of t0(c,F),f o rbF = 1
40 is displayed
in Figure 11. It is a strictly decreasing and (slightly) convex function.












Figure 11: The limit tax rate as a function of c, with positive ﬁxed costs
19Notice that, for bF = 1
40, the limit tax rate is only positive for low enough values of c.I nf a c t ,
with this example, the limit tax rate goes to 0 at c =0 .68377. All this is really saying is that
when the marginal cost is high enough and a ﬁxed cost is present, the user’s business becomes
unproﬁtable, since even if the input were supplied free of charge, the user still makes a non-positive
proﬁt. As F goes up, the graph of the limit tax rate moves downwards.
Finally, in Figure 12 we graph the limit tax rate (in red) together with the optimal tax rate
(in black) and the lower bound on the Nash solution tax rate (in purple). While not really visible
in the graph, for the parameters chosen, it turns out that the optimal rate is actually lower than
the limit rate, but only for a very small range of value of c. Concretely, between about c =0 .1162
and c =0 .2, the optimal rate dips below the limit rate (although only very very slightly). Thus
(at least for the parameter values used here), the ﬁxed cost makes the optimal tax rate impossible
for all but a very small range of values of c. Since the limit tax function shifts downwards with an
increase in F, we can easily see that there will be values of F (not signiﬁcantly greater than the
1
10 that is assumed in the graph) for which there would be no values of c for which the optimal
tax rate is feasible. However, the lower bound on the Nash tax rate is lower than the limit tax for
all but quite large levels of c. Thus the lower bound on the Nash tax rate is feasible for a large set
of values of marginal cost. Concretly, with the parameters used in this example, the lower bound
on the Nash tax rate is below the limit tax rate for all values of c less than 0.59116.












Figure 12: Comparison between the limit tax rate, the optimal tax rate, and the lower bound
Nash tax rate
7 Regulatory policy recommendations
While simpliﬁed with respect to the real world, the above model allows us to grasp some initial
insights into copyright contracts that are stipulated to be a revenue sharing arrangement between
the user and the copyright holder. The model looks only at optimal sharing arrangements from
the perspective of the copyright holder,16 although we have also established an interesting lower
bound on the tax rate that would emerge from an evenly structured bargaining game. The model
only requires knowledge of a few concrete variables in order for it to provide guidance as to the
optimal tax rate, and of course as to the lower bound on the bargaining tax rate. Speciﬁcally, we
need to know the value of c, the marginal cost as a fraction of the vertical intercept of the demand
function.17 If there is a ﬁxed cost present in the user’s production process, then F would also
have to be known, since the ﬁxed cost alters the set of feasible tax rates that can be used, as
would the slope parameter of the demand curve.
16 Of course, an optimal arrangement from the perspective of the user is to simply set the tax rate to 0.
17 If, in a real-world setting, the demand function and/or the cost function were estimated to be non-linear, it
would be necessary to simply extract the linear approximation to each curve in order to apply the model.
21The most interesting rate from the perspective of regulatory policy is the lower bound on the
Nash bargaining rate. The Nash bargaining model posits an unrestricted bargaining process, with
equal bargaining powers. Thus the rate that emerges from the Nash bargaining game is fair and
equitable to all parties. When compared to the Nash solution, the lower bound that we have
established for the Nash rate is more favourable to the user than to the copyright holder. It also
happens that the lower bound on the Nash rate is likely to be feasible when there is a ﬁxed cost
present in the problem, at least for a reasonably large set of parameters. Thus, the lower bound
on the tax rate may go some distance in solving the problem that is often faced by regulators
when they attempt to set a fair revenue tariﬀ.
Given that there are likely to be some ﬁxed costs in the user’s production function, my sug-
gestion for a regulated revenue tax is















We can use this to get an idea about how well reglators in the real world have managed to set
a fair rate. In order to do this, I shall posit a simple example, based on the broadcast music radio
business. In the music radio business, where a regulated revenue tax is habitually used, this tax
rate is normally held under 5%.
Consider the traditional radio broadcasting business. The good produced, x, is audience which
is then sold to advertisers. Since advertisers will have decreasing marginal willingness to pay for
an aditional unit of audience, it is certainly reasonable that the demand curve for advertising
faced by a radio station is decreasing in the audience size, just as has been assumed in this paper.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that there is indeed some price at which demand would go to 0
(at least, in a linear approximation to the demand curve).
Consider the cost situation of a typical radio station. The radio business is largely run according
to a cost model that is independent of the audience reached.18 The main costs are to obtain
frequency, purchasing and maintaining broadcasting equipment, oﬃce space, wages of disc-jockies,
18 There is a diﬀerence here with internet broadcast radio. When more audience is to be reached, greater
bandwidth is required, and so there is a strong element of variable cost in the internet radio business.
22program directors and executives, etc.19 In fact the only cost that would be associated with
altering the audience would seem to be those costs incurred in marketing.
Take a radio station operating in a medium sized city. Assume that the demand curve for




Say that outside of any payment for the music input (i.e. for now we set t =0 ), the station has $1.5
million in total costs. Let’s say frequency costs, equipment, oﬃce space, wages etc. (i.e. costs that
are independent of audience) all add up to $1.3 million, leaving $200,000 per year for marketing
(the only variable cost). We know that the station will set output (i.e. audience) according to






=4 ,000,000(1 − c)
The average variable cost (per unit audience) is thus equal to
200,000
4,000,000(1 − c)
=0 .05(1 − c)
If the cost function is indeed linear, then average variable cost is equal to marginal cost, so
c =0 .05(1 − c)
from which c =0 .0476.










Substituting in the numbers that we have (t =0 , b = 1






=2 ,000,000(1 − 0.0476)2 − 1,300,000
= 514,131.52
19 Of course the radio must also pay collecting organisations for the right to broadcast music. However, since
this is exactly the fee that we are interested in calcluating here, we shall deal with it separately.
20 Here, x is the number of listeners of the station, averaged over all broadcast minutes.














2+0 .0476 + 0.04762
¶
=0 .24337
And, since bF =
1,300,000
8.000.000 =0 .1625 the limit tax rate is










Since the limit rate is greater than the Nash rate, the Nash rate is a feasible tax (i.e. it
leaves the user with strictly positive proﬁt). Thus, with this example, the regulator should set the
revenue tax rate at about 24.3%. At that tax rate, the user still earns strictly positive proﬁt, and
t h er a t ei s ,b yd e ﬁnition, fair to both parties.21 For comparison, in this example the value of
1
4(1 − c), which as we saw earlier is a value that approximates (but is less than) the lower bound
on the Nash tax rate, is 0.2381.
Indeed, at the tax rate of 0.243, using (12) and (5) we can calculate that the total proﬁto ft h e
user is $29,586.16, and the copyright holder earns income of $484,078,42. It is, perhaps, instruc-
tive to note that, when the revenue tax is installed, the total surplus is 29,586.16+484,078,42 =
513,664.58, which is smaller than the total surplus when the tax is set at 0 (which is 514,131.52).
Thus, it would be better for the copyright holder to set a tax rate of 0, and to charge a ﬁxed fee
of 514,131.52 − 29,586.16 = 484,545.36. If this could be done, the user would be indiﬀerent to
the ﬁxed fee situation and the regulated revenue tax, but the copyright holder would be better
oﬀ. This example serves to show that although in many situations the regulator makes a revenue
tax the compulsory compensation mechanism, this may be ineﬃcient.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I have analysed a model in which a copyright holder supplies an essential input
to a user, and in exchange for the input the copyright holder is remunerated under a revenue
21 Since this is only a ﬁcticious example, we should not read too much into the large diference between the
revenue tax rate that the model gives (24.3%) and the real-world rates of closer to 5%. Until real-world data can
be brought to the model to calibrate it, we cannot know how the 5% standard compares to a fair negotiated rate.
24sharing rule, that is, by a tax on the user’s revenue. The analysis shows that, if there are no
ﬁxed costs in the user’s production process, the optimal tax rate (from the point of view of the
copyright holder) will always leave the user with positive earnings, but in most situations (those
with a strictly positive marginal cost) will imply that the copyright holder earns more of the total
surplus that is generated than does the user.
If the monopoly power that the copyright holder has when the remuneration system is negoti-
ated is considered to be excessive, then one could look to the Nash bargaining model for guidance
as to a fair revenue tax. The Nash bargaining model removes any monopoly power that the copy-
right holder has over the user when the revenue tax is set, and thus it constitutes a fair tariﬀ.
It turns out that while the Nash tax rate can always be calculated (once the parameters of the
model are known), it is excessively complex. However, an interesting lower bound on the Nash
tax rate can be found, and it has a relatively simple expression.22 Using the lower bound on the
Nash tax rate, if the user’s production process has no ﬁxed costs, then the user will always get a
signiﬁcantly greater share of the total surplus than would the copyright holder.
In the paper we have looked at both the simple case in which the user operates with no ﬁxed
costs, and the more complex case in which ﬁxed costs are present. The presence of ﬁxed costs
does not alter the calculation of either the optimal revenue tax rate or the Nash tax rate (or the
lower bound on the Nash tax rate), but it does imply that there is an upper bound on the tax
rate that can be used. However, we have shown (by example) that while the upper bound might
be a serious impediment to the use of an optimal tax rate, it generally appears to leave plenty of
scope for the use of the lower bound on the Nash tax rate.
T h em o d e li nt h ep r e s e n tp a p e ri so n l yp u tf o r w a r da saﬁr s ts t e p ,a n di tc a nb ei m p r o v e d
upon and more generally modiﬁed in several interesting ways.
The most obvious extention to the present model would be to calibrate it against some real-
world data. While I do not have any hard data on hand concerning the operation of music radio
generally, I conjecture that the lower bound on the Nash tax rate suggested in this paper is
22 And we also have an even simpler expression that acts as a lower bound on this lower bound, and is actually
a rather close approximation.
25signiﬁcantly greater than the tariﬀs that are levied in the real world as a result of regulatory
practices in music radio. Since the lower bound is based upon a fair and unconstrained bargaining
game, it removes any monopoly power held by the copyright holder, I conjecture that the regulated
tariﬀs are generally too low. However, I stress that this is only conjecture, and the true relationship
between the real-world regulated rates and the fair rate suggested here can only be known once
some real-world data is inserted into the present model.
At a theoretical level, it is interesting to wonder what would happen if instead of supplying the
copyright product to a single user, the copyright holder were to deal with many users? That is,
what if the user actually operated in an oligopolistic market, rather than being a monopolist. So
long as the copyright holder were obliged not to refuse any user (compulsory licensing), and were
obliged not to discriminate amoung users in terms of price, the model might not change much
from what is present in the current paper. Still, it would be interesting to ﬁnd out.
Appendix
In several places in the following proofs, we need to use the value of the market price of the
user´s good, 1 − bx∗(t).S i n c ew eh a v e
x∗(t)=
(1 − t) − c
2b(1 − t)
it turns out that
1 − bx∗(t)=1 − b
µ





(1 − t) − c
2(1 − t)
¶
Giving this a common denominator, we get
1 − bx∗(t)=






1) In Theorem 1, we are interested in ﬁnding the tax rate that sets (1−t2)(1−bx∗(t2))−c =0 .












which simpliﬁes directly to the equation given in the text.







(1 − t) − c
2b(1 − t)
¶
Combining the terms in both the numerator and denominator we get
R(t)=
t((1 − t)+c)((1 − t) − c)
4b(1 − t)2
=
t((1 − t)2 − c2)
4b(1 − t)2
which is the equation given in the text.









(1 − t)2 − c2
1 − t
¶




























(1 − t)2 − c2 + t
¡









(1 − t)2 − c2 + t
¡





























This is the equation given in the text.






c2(1 − t)3 +( 1+t)c23(1 − t)2
(1 − t)6
¶






c2(1 − t)+( 1+t)c23
(1 − t)4
¶



















4) To express the user’s proﬁt as a function of the copyright holder’s income, we ﬁrstly split
the proﬁt equation into three separate terms;
π(t)=[ ( 1 − t)(1 − bx∗(t)) − c]x∗(t)
=( 1 − bx∗(t))x∗(t) − t(1 − bx∗(t))x∗(t) − x∗(t)c
But, the second of those terms is equal to the copyright holder’s income, and the ﬁrst term is




− R(t) − x∗(t)c







5) In order to get the reduced form for the ratio of proﬁt to copyright income, substituting













































28Now we see that there is a common factor of 1−t












Finally, giving the square bracket term a common denominator and simplifying gives the
















(1 − t) − c
(1 − t)+c
¸






(1 − t − c)2
1 − t
¶






−2(1 − t − c)(1 − t)+( 1− t − c)2
(1 − t)2
¶






























(1 − t − c)(1 − t + c)
(1 − t)2
¶












w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( 5 ) .














t(1 − t + c)+
µ
1 − t − c
1 − t
¶3
(1 − 2t + c)
#
29Multiply the second term in square brackets by 1−t












[−3ct(1 − t + c)+( 1− t)(1− t − c)(1− 2t + c)]
This is the equation given in the text.








1 − t − c
1 − t + c
¶
L e t ’ sw o r kt h i so u tt e r mb yt e r mf o rt h ec a s eo f


















2(2 + c + c2) − (1 − c2)
2(2 + c + c2)
=
4+4 c +4 c2 − 1+c2
2(2 + c + c2)
=
3+4 c +5 c2
2(2 + c + c2)




3+4 c +5 c2
1 − c2
Second, we need to work out both 1 − tNe− c and 1 − tNe + c.T h eﬁrst of these is
1 − tNe− c =
3+4 c +5 c2
2(2 + c + c2)
− c
=
3+4 c +5 c2 − c2(2 + c + c2)
2(2 + c + c2)
=
3+4 c +5 c2 − 4c − 2c2 − 2c3
2(2 + c + c2)
=
3+3 c2 − 2c3
2(2 + c + c2)
30And the second of them is
1 − tNe+ c =
3+4 c +5 c2
2(2 + c + c2)
+ c
=
3+4 c +5 c2 + c2(2 + c + c2)
2(2 + c + c2)
=
3+4 c +5 c2 +4 c +2 c2 +2 c3
2(2 + c + c2)
=
3+8 c +7 c2 +2 c3
2(2 + c + c2)
Therefore, we get
1 − t − c
1 − t + c
=
3+3 c2 − 2c3






3+4 c +5 c2
1 − c2
¶µ
3+3 c2 − 2c3
3+8 c +7 c2 +2 c3
¶
which is the equation given in the text.
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